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This paper presents the key findings of a major empirical investigation into 
defamation law and social attitudes. It examines the way in which the law 
decides whether a publication is defamatory, and the consequences for that 
process of a phenomenon known as the third-person effect: the tendency for 
individuals to perceive the adverse impact of a communication as greater on 
others than on themselves. It argues that, as a result of this tendency, 
defamation law unnecessarily and unfairly silences speech on the basis of 
protection to reputation, even though little or no reputational harm would 
actually occur. What is more, defamation law perpetuates regressive 




Whenever people or organisations sue, or threaten to sue, for defamation, one 
question always arises: have they been or are they about to be defamed? 
Often the defamation will seem obvious. It might even be admitted by the 
defendant that the publication is defamatory, in which case the parties may 
move on to arguing what seem more substantive matters, such as whether the 
allegations are substantially true, or whether some other defence to their 
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publication exists.
1
 In other cases the question whether the publication is 
defamatory remains central to the dispute, something that must ultimately be 
determined by a court. But whether or not this is the case, two issues are 
fundamental in all defamation actions. First, what imputations, if any, does 
the publication convey in relation to the aggrieved party? Second, does the 
publication, as a consequence of those imputations, meet some legal 
definition of defamation? Together the answers to these questions go towards 
determining whether the material that has been or is about to be published is 




This paper relates to how those two questions are answered. It arises from a 
central feature of defamation law in Australia: as a general rule neither 
question is answered on the basis of empirical evidence.
3
 Those who heard or 
saw a publication are rarely asked to give evidence as to what they 
understood it to mean, or whether, for instance, they thought less of the 
plaintiff as a result of their interpretation.
4
 Normally a plaintiff is not required 
to produce evidence of any actual harm resulting from the publication: a 
‘tendency’ to harm suffices.
5
 Even more puzzling, a defendant is not even 
allowed to call proof that no harm was done in order to prove that a 




Instead, the defamatory nature of a publication is determined on the basis of 
assumptions about how a hypothetical audience would interpret and react to 
it. But who is this hypothetical audience meant to represent? And how 
accurate are the assumptions made about them? Although this paper is 
                                                 
1 Historically, Australia’s laws of defamation varied substantially from state to state and from 
territory to territory. In the last few years, however, each state and territory has enacted new 
defamation laws, with the result that Australia now has a relatively uniform law of defamation 
(although minor differences remain). Each state and territory’s statute relating to defamation 
sets out the available defences to the publication of defamatory material. In each case these 
include a defence of substantial truth (otherwise known as justification): Defamation Act 2005 
(NSW) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 25; Defamation 
Act 2005 (SA) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 25; 
Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 22; Civil Law (Wrongs) Amendment Act 2006 (ACT) s 135. 
2 For a general introduction to Australia’s laws of defamation, see Sharon Rodrick and Des 
Butler, Australian Media Law (3rd ed, 2007) Chapter 3. Even so, Australia shares most of the 
elements of defamation law dealt with in this paper with England. That being the case, a more 
detailed description of the relevant areas of law can be found in Patrick Milmo and WVH 
Rogers (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander (10th ed, 2004) particularly Chapters 2 and 3.  
3 See, eg, Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65, 70 (Lord Bridge).  
4 An exception might be when the plaintiff seeks to recover special or actual damages. 
5 English and Scottish Co-operative v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440, 461 (Lord Goddard 
LJ).   
6 Hough v London Express Newspapers [1940] 2 KB 507. 
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concerned with these questions, ultimately it does not answer them. They 
cannot easily be answered, since the legal purpose behind the choice of a 
hypothetical as opposed to real audience as a determinant of defamation is 
ambiguous. Instead, I present a range of plausible interpretations of the law’s 
purpose. I shall suggest that these are plausible in two senses: first, that all of 
them are substantiated by authority, at least to the extent that none of them 
can readily be disregarded as doctrinally wrong; secondly, that we might 
reasonably expect to hear any of them if we were to ask those involved with 
defamation law, be they lawyers, judges or jurors, as well as the actual or 
potential parties to proceedings, what they think the law means.  
 
What this paper argues is that this ambiguity, as well as other features of the 
law, leads to unsatisfactory results. Whatever plausible interpretation we give 
to the law’s intentions, they are not being achieved. In particular, the current 
law, combined with widespread misperceptions about the impact of media 
communications, gives rise to two undesirable outcomes. First, harm to 
reputation is consistently overestimated, to the unjust advantage of the 
plaintiff. This in turn unnecessarily and unintentionally silences harmless 
speech, or overcompensates for what harm is done. Secondly, defamation law 
can perpetuate socially regressive and exclusionary attitudes.  
 
These conclusions derive from groundbreaking research into social attitudes 
and defamation. This involved a survey of 3,000 randomly-selected 
Australians, supplemented by focus groups held around the country involving 
various sections of the community, as well as extensive interviewing of 
judges, lawyers and journalists across four states.
7
 Although the research 
relates most directly to defamation law, the results are relevant to any field of 
legal practice involving perceptions of social attitudes and behaviour, 
particularly perceptions of how society is affected by various media. 
Obviously relevant areas of law include the regulation and censorship of such 
media content as sexual and violent images, as well as vilification laws, the 
tort of passing off and laws protecting courts from media influence, to name 





                                                 
7 Judges and lawyers were interviewed in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane. Of the 
eight focus groups one was held in New South Wales (in Guildford, western Sydney), two in 
Victoria (in Moe, eastern Victoria and in central Melbourne), one in South Australia (in Black 
Forest, Adelaide), three in Queensland (in Ipswich, Cairns and central Brisbane) and one in the 
Northern Territory (in Alice Springs). 
       DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                                VOLUME 13 NO 1 4
II THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE TEST FOR DEFAMATION 
 
Currently there is no codified definition of what constitutes a defamatory 
publication in Australia.
8
 Instead, the common law presents various 
formulations of the test for defamation, all of which have one thing in 
common: what are determinative are perceptions of how a particular, 
hypothetical audience would respond to the publication if exposed to it. If it 
would be likely to respond in one or more specific ways then the publication 
is defamatory. The relevant responses have been variously described, but 
they generally relate to denigration of character: hatred or contempt for the 
plaintiffs, damage to their reputation, and so on.
9
 This paper is concerned less 
with the nature of those responses than who must be likely to exhibit them. 
What is the nature of the audience who must be prone to experiencing the 
relevant response (thinking less of the plaintiffs, hating them, and so forth) 
before a publication can be described as defamatory?  
 
Two things are certain. First, as already stated, the relevant audience is 
hypothetical: the test for defamation is not based on the responses of those 
who actually heard or saw whatever material prompted the plaintiff to sue. 
Secondly, the relevant audience need not necessarily reflect the people whose 
estimation matters the most to the plaintiff, such as family, friends or 
customers. As put by Fleming, ‘it is not sufficient that the words are regarded 
as prejudicial by only a small minority whose standards are so anti-social that 




Who, then, does the hypothetical audience represent? Its members are often 
described by two adjectives: they are ‘ordinary reasonable people’. 
Sometimes one or both of these descriptors are replaced by terms of varying 
synonymy, or disappear altogether.
11
 Yet all the judges and defamation law 
                                                 
8 Prior to 2006, codified definitions were to be found in the defamation law of Queensland and 
Tasmania: Defamation Act 1889 s 4(1) (Qld), repealed by Defamation Act 2005 s 47 (Qld); 
Defamation Act 1957 s 5(1) (Tas), repealed by Defamation Act 2005(Tas). 
9 For just a few of the most commonly cited formulations of the test for defamation see 
Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 108 (Parke B), Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 
1237, 1240 (Lord Atkin), Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) SR(NSW) 171, 172 
(Jordan CJ), Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer (1934) 50 TLR 581, 587 (Slesser LJ), 
Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 (Lord Selbourne). 
10 J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) 583. 
11 For instance, ‘reasonable men’ (Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741, 
745 (Lord Selbourne)), ‘man of fair average intelligence’ (Slatyer v Daily Telegraph 
Newspaper Co Ltd (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 488, 504, aff’d (1908) 6 CLR 1 (Griffith CJ)), 
‘ordinary men not avid for scandal’ (Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 260 (Lord 
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practitioners interviewed for this paper accepted that the phrase ‘ordinary 
reasonable people’ adequately describes the members of the relevant 
audience. 
 
To call someone ordinary can, depending on context and political 
consciousness, be either affirming or disparaging. But there is also a 
quantitative aspect to ‘ordinary’, a word that might be understood to suggest 
‘majority’ or ‘average’. A likelihood, then, is that the relevant audience 
reflects a far broader community than whatever readership the offending 
publication enjoyed, or whoever number among the plaintiff’s circle of 
acquaintances and business connections. 
 
Indeed, one plausible interpretation of a legal test that speaks in terms of 
‘ordinary reasonable people’ is to take it as a reference to general public 
opinion. The question then becomes how the majority of people, or the 
average person, would interpret the publication in question and would 
consequently view the plaintiff. If this were the test then quantitative research 
methodologies such as opinion surveys could be employed with relative ease 
to determine whether a publication is defamatory.   
 
Even so, the authorities tend not to refer to majority or average opinion, but 
allude instead to the views of ‘ordinary reasonable people’, or some group 
similarly described. ‘Reasonable’ is a less obvious quantifier than is 
‘ordinary’. It seems more unambiguously normative, to relate more directly 
to intellectual and moral virtues. This is evident from the view sometimes 
expressed that the allusion to reasonableness exists for the protection of 
defendants, who should be liable only for interpretations of their publications 
that they ought to have anticipated, being those of the reasonable person, as 
opposed to outlandish readings by the unreasonable, such as those avid for 
scandal.
12
 The allusion to rationality or high morals is even more apparent 
when formulations of the common law test replace ‘reasonable’ with terms 
such as ‘right-thinking’ or ‘decent’.
13
 There is potential for the view that such 
people constitute only part of the community of ‘ordinary people’, perhaps 
even a small elite. Indeed they may be ‘reasonable’, ‘decent’ or ‘right-
thinking’ precisely because they are not ordinary. 
                                                                                                                    
Reith)), ‘ordinary people of reasonable intelligence’ (Mount Cook Group v Johnstone Motors 
[1990] 2 NZLR 488 (Tipping J)). 
12 For instance, Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (2005) 39-40.  
13 For instance ‘average right-thinking man’ (Tolley v JS Fry & Sons Ltd [1930] 1 KB 467, 479 
(Greer LJ)); ‘right-thinking members of society generally’ (Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, 
671 (Lord Atkin)); ‘ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general’ (Gardiner v John 
Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) SR(NSW) 171, 172 (Gordon CJ)). 
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We now reach the ambiguity that is the concern of this paper. Two 
communities have emerged, either of which might be represented by the 
law’s hypothetical audience of ‘ordinary reasonable people’. The first is 
defined inclusively: its membership is more closely coterminous with some 
geographically determined population, such as all the adult residents of a 
particular jurisdiction. The second is more exclusive: a greater proportion of 
a geographically delineated population will fall outside its parameters on the 
basis that it fails the normative criterion of reasonableness.  
 
The difference between ‘ordinary’ and ‘reasonable’ people, as these terms are 
understood by the law, may be vast, but more likely it is subtle. The point 
may even seem pedantic. Certainly it is rarely discussed in academic 
commentary on defamation law.
14
 What is more, our research suggests that it 
is not a difference considered important by judges involved in defamation 
litigation, nor by defamation law practitioners. But I suggest that it is worth 
some consideration and later I hope to argue that it reveals the full enormity 
of the gulf between the law’s possible intentions and what, according to the 
research findings, are its practical outcomes. 
 
First, however, we need to look more closely at how the law describes the 
relevant audience. After examining all leading decisions on the point, I 
submit that none offer clear guidance as to its precise nature. This paper 
cannot analyse all relevant judgments, but just two serve to illustrate the 
difficulty. First is the 1982 High Court decision in Reader’s Digest Services 
Pty Ltd v Lamb, where Brennan J said: 
 
Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the 
understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a 
uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the 
standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation 
they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a 
moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory 




                                                 
14 For a few examples of the issue being raised, see Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘Defamation 
Law in a Changing Society: The Case of Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer’ (2000) 21 
Legal Studies 291; Roger Magnusson, ‘Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: 
Ridicule, Satire and Other Challenges’ (2001) 9 Torts Law Journal 269; Graham Fricke, ‘The 
Criterion of Defamation’ (1958) 32 Australian Law Journal 7; Lawrence McNamara, ‘Bigotry, 
Community and the (In)visibility of Moral Exclusion: Homosexuality and the Capacity to 
Defame’ (2001) 6 Media & Arts Law Review 271; Marina Lloyd Jones, ‘Imputations of 
Homosexuality in Defamation Actions’ (2001) 5(6) TeleMedia, 94. 
15 (1982) 150 CLR 500, 505 (citations omitted). 
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The reference to standards ‘common to society generally’ suggests that a 
court, in deciding what is defamatory, needs to consider the prevailing values 
of a geographically determined population, taking that population as a whole. 
It might start by looking for consensus, but if there clearly is no consensus on 
an issue then it would probably settle for what it perceives to be the view of 
the majority, or some kind of average viewpoint, in which case a survey that 
asks what people think and how strongly they hold those views would have 
obvious application. 
 
But note the stark contrast between the above authority and a judgment 
delivered in the New South Wales Court of Appeal some months later, 
which, puzzlingly, failed to refer to the High Court decision. In Hepburn v 
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd the question arose whether it is defamatory to 
accuse a registered medical practitioner of conducting lawful abortions.
16
 
Hutley JA thought the argument that such an imputation is not capable of 
being defamatory to be ‘startling’: 
 
As any abortion is regarded as wicked by a substantial part of the 
population on moral grounds, to say of a person that he is an 





Glass JA addressed the issue more fully and concluded: 
 
[A] man can justly complain that words, which lower him in the 
estimation of an appreciable and reputable section of the 
community, were published to members of it, even though those 
same words might exalt him to the level of a hero in other quarters. 
Where a television programme has been beamed to a large audience 
it can be presumed, without special proof, that its viewers will 
include some who advocate the “right to life” and abhor the 
destruction of foetuses, whatever the circumstances. In the 
estimation of such persons the plaintiff can claim to have been 




Now the question is not what most people think, but what do some people 
think? Two layers of difficulty emerge from these and similar authorities. 
First, there is the lack of clarity as to how a court is supposed to choose 
between two approaches which I shall describe as sectionalist and 
majoritarian. Secondly, and more fundamentally, is the central ambiguity 
                                                 
16 [1983] 2 NSWLR 682. 
17 Ibid 686. 
18 Ibid 694. 
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which concerns this paper: whether the law should be understood as moralist 
or realist, terms I shall define once I have addressed the first difficulty. 
 
A Sectionalist and Majoritarian Approaches to 
Defamation 
 
Reader’s Digest restricts the definition of defamatory publication to one that 
imputes to the plaintiff an act or condition that falls foul of some ‘standard 
common to society generally’. This suggests that disapproval of the imputed 
act or condition must reflect some social consensus, or at least majority or 
average opinion within society. I shall refer to this as the majoritarian 
approach.  
 
According to Hepburn, however, it can suffice that the publication might lead 
to damage to reputation among an ‘appreciable’ or ‘substantial’ section of the 
community, which presumably can include a minority. I shall call this 
approach sectionalism. While under Reader’s Digest ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’ are typified, perhaps even defined by their response to the imputed 
act or condition, under Hepburn the community of ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’ is less homogeneous in its responses to the imputation, with large 
proportions of its members holding diametrically opposed views. Most of the 
judges and defamation law practitioners we interviewed favoured a 
majoritarian approach, but there was also substantial support for a sectionalist 
one. 
 
Whichever approach is correct, an opinion poll might assist in determining 
what is defamatory. Under a majoritarian approach, a poll might reveal what 
is majority or average opinion on an issue (for instance, whether most people 
disapprove of doctors who perform abortions and, if so, the average strength 
of their disapproval). Under a sectionalist approach, a poll will help the court 
assess whether an ‘appreciable’ or ‘substantial’ section of the community or 
population would think less of the plaintiff. 
 
B Moralist and Realist Approaches to Defamation 
 
Note, however, that a poll only takes the court so far. It will not help in 
deciding whether to define the relevant community inclusively or 
exclusively. The problem is most apparent in Glass JA’s requirement that the 
section of the community that would think less of the plaintiff be not just 
‘appreciable’ but also ‘reputable’. On an inclusive interpretation this 
additional requirement becomes relatively unimportant, so that the 
defamatory nature of a publication can be determined by reference to the 
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views of almost any ‘appreciable’ section of the community, discounting 
only some kind of depraved or lunatic fringe. On a more exclusive 
interpretation, however, a greater number of sectional attitudes are 
disregarded on the basis that their adherents are not ‘reputable’. 
 
But there is a second, even more fundamental problem for the court: should it 
determine who is reputable by means of objective or subjective criteria? The 
term ‘reputable’ might be understood to mean 1) ‘held in good repute’, 
meaning that the sub-community in question is generally accepted by the 
broader community, or 2) ‘deserving of good repute’, meaning that, in the 
eyes of the court, the sub-community should be accepted by the broader 
community, even if in fact it is not. The first calls for an objective approach, 
the second a subjective one.  
 
The lack of clarity as to whether the court should adopt an approach that is 
objective or subjective, inclusive or exclusive, extends well beyond Glass 
JA’s sectionalist formulation of the test, whereby an imputation is 
defamatory if it would affect the plaintiff in the eyes of an ‘appreciable and 
reputable section of the community’. It also arises in majoritarian statements 
of the law. If the determinative criterion is the view of most ‘ordinary 
reasonable people’, what weight should be given to ‘reasonable’? Does the 
law in effect mean most ‘ordinary people’, which might translate as majority 
or average opinion? Or does the reference to reasonableness require a more 
exclusive approach, so that the court only considers the views of sections of 
the community who meet certain intellectual and moral criteria? 
 
If the latter is the correct approach, this creates real obstacles to any attempt 
to apply quantitative research methodologies to defamation. Their usefulness 
would be far more obvious if the test for a defamatory publication were that 
the plaintiff’s reputation would suffer in the eyes of the majority of a 
geographically determined population. Such a simple, objective approach 
could be termed realism.
19
 For instance, one realist statement of the law 
would be that a publication is defamatory if most people resident within a 
certain area would consequently think less of the plaintiff, even if the court 
takes the view that it is entirely irrational or wicked to do so. A realist court 
might usefully employ opinion polls, since this approach could provide the 
pollster with an objectively defined base population to sample and canvass. 
 
                                                 
19 See the following footnote as regards my adaptation of this term. 
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In contrast to realism is an approach that I shall refer to as moralism.
20
 While 
the realist court is concerned with what people really think, the moralist court 
is also concerned with what they should think or, to be more precise, whether 
the relevant views meet certain thresholds in terms of rationality and 
morality. For instance, a moralist court might consider an imputation of 
homosexuality non-defamatory, even in the face of evidence of prevalent 
homophobia, on the basis that sexual orientation is irrelevant to a person’s 
moral character. Under such an approach the usefulness of empirical research 
is clearly limited.  
 
This basic ambiguity in the law (whether it is realist or moralist) obviously 
touches on larger jurisprudential issues. These will not be explored in this 
paper, since my purpose lies not in resolving the ambiguity but in exploring 
its potential outcomes in practice. It is worth noting, however, that the 
confusion arises in part from the tendency of judges to fail to distinguish 
between two potentially distinct entities. On the one hand we have what is 
referred to by Brennan J as ‘society’ and by Hutley JA as ‘community’ (two 
terms I shall treat as synonymous). On the other we have the geographically 
defined population, be it the adult residents of a city, jurisdiction, country or 
perhaps even larger area. What the common law fails to reveal is the extent to 
which these are coterminous. In other words, it is unclear whether 
membership of society or a community, as the law uses these terms, involves 
more than living within a certain area.
21
 Not knowing this causes difficulties, 
not only for the pollster who needs a clear, objective definition of the base 
population but also for the court if it is to approach its task with a clear mind.  
 
It may help to express the problem somewhat differently. It is clear from 
Hepburn that a publication can be defamatory when only a minority of the 
geographically determined population would think less of the plaintiff. So far 
it has been assumed that the same is not true under the test proposed in 
Reader’s Digest. But we should open our minds to other possibilities. 
Brennan J in Reader’s Digest required that disapproval of the imputed act or 
condition must be reflected in a ‘standard common to society generally’, 
which probably refers to majority or average opinion within the 
geographically determined population.
22
 But the judge also tells us that the 
                                                 
20 I have adapted the terms ‘realism’ and ‘moralism’ from Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, above 
n 14, although she uses the terms somewhat differently. There is also some similarity between 
my (and Treiger-Bar-Am’s) concepts of realism and moralism and the ideas defined by the 
terms ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ as used by Roger Magnusson, above n 14. 
21 For general discussion on the concept of ‘community’ see, for instance, Elizabeth Frazer, 
The Problems of Communitarian Politics – Unity and Conflict (1999). 
22 (1982) 150 CLR 500, 505. 
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relevant audience consists of ‘Lord Selbourne’s reasonable men or Lord 
Atkin’s right-thinking members of society generally or Lord Reid’s ordinary 
men not avid for scandal’, these being allusions to frequently cited 
formulations of the test for defamation.
23
 This suggests that some of the 
geographically determined population is excluded, not least unreasonable 
men (and women?), non-right-thinkers and those who are avid for scandal.  
 
The point may appear immaterial. It might seem preposterous to suggest that 
Brennan J means us to understand ‘society’ as anything other than a reference 
to the vast bulk of the population. But it is important to note that membership 
of society cannot be defined wholly by reference to geographical criteria, so 
that everyone who lives in a certain area is automatically a member of a 
particular society. The point can best be illustrated via the work of Robert 
Post, who has produced a particularly interesting conceptualisation of 
defamation law.
24
 For Post, defamation law operates to enforce society’s 
interest ‘in defining and maintaining the contours of its own social 
constitution’.
25
 In other words, defamation law helps to define society’s 
parameters. To publish a defamation about someone is to challenge their right 
to membership, or at least full membership, of society. If it is defamatory to 
impute to a plaintiff a particular act or condition, then only those who are not 
‘guilty’ of that act or condition can claim full membership of the society the 
law exists to serve. Those who are ‘guilty’ may still be members of society, 
but in not quite the same way, or not quite to the same extent.  
 
If society were delineated solely by geographical criteria, so that everyone 
within a certain jurisdiction is a full member and all those outside are not, 
then the only way to defame someone would be to suggest that they do not 
live within the jurisdiction. Since that does not defame, but many other 
imputations do, this supports the proposition that the community is primarily 
defined by normative criteria, with individuals’ membership determined by 
the extent to which their actions and values gain acceptance within the 
community. Hence it may be referred to as the ‘moral community’. 
 
That being so, it obfuscates the issue to treat the terms ‘society’ or 
‘community’ as though interchangeable with ‘population’ (as geographically 
                                                 
23 Ibid. The judgments being referred to are Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App 
Cas 741, 745 (re Lord Selbourne’s ‘reasonable men’), Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, 671 
(re Lord Atkin’s ‘right-thinking members of society generally’) and Lewis v Daily Telegraph 
Ltd [1964] AC 234, 260 (re Lord Reith’s ‘ordinary men not avid for scandal’). 
24 Robert Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ 
(1986) 74 California Law Review 691. 
25 Ibid 711. 
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defined). But this does not mean that ‘society’ or the ‘community’ cannot be 
defined popularly, that is? by the entire (adult) population. That is what a 
realist defamation court would hope to do. The fact that the defamatory 
nature of a publication is determined by the views and reactions of ‘ordinary 
reasonable people’ suggests that the society or community the law seeks to 
help define, or whose contours it seeks to maintain, to borrow Post’s 
metaphor, consists of ‘ordinary reasonable people’. Individuals who do not 
qualify as ‘ordinary reasonable people’ will number among the population, 
but they cannot claim full membership of the community that is the concern 
of defamation law.  
 
The difference between the moralist and the realist court is that the latter 
adopts an objective approach when deciding who qualifies as an ordinary 
reasonable person, doing so by reference to the views of the entire, 
geographically determined population. In other words, the population decides 
the limits of the community. The moralist court, on the other hand, considers 
itself entitled to subjectively decide who falls within the community of 
ordinary reasonable people. For instance, it may decide to deny homophobes 
the status of ‘ordinary reasonable people’, even if it perceives homophobia as 
a social norm, on the basis that disparagement of homosexuals has no sound 
moral foundation. Thus the moralist court, not the population, determines the 
community. 
 
It does not necessarily follow that realist courts will be inclusive and moralist 
courts exclusive when it comes to delineating the relevant community. A 
moralist court might consider its right to disregard the views of sections of 
the population, on the basis that they would respond inappropriately to the 
publication, as a power to be used most sparingly. It is even conceivable that 
a moralist court might be more inclusive than a realist court. The realist court, 
by definition, must adhere to popular normative standards, but if it perceives 
the relevant community as constituting a small but identifiable minority of 
the population then it would be highly exclusive. That might be the case if, 
for instance, the law were to define a defamatory imputation as one that 
would damage a person’s reputation in the eyes of the ‘exceptionally 
intelligent’, in which case the task for the realist court would be to decide 
who, according to the general population, qualifies as ‘exceptionally 
intelligent’.  
 
But the test for defamation relates not to the ‘exceptionally intelligent’ but to 
‘ordinary reasonable people’, and it seems fanciful to imagine that, by 
popular consensus, the latter phrase identifies some distinct elite. Certainly 
that was not a claim made during any of the focus group discussions or 
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interviews conducted for this paper. For practical purposes, then, a realist 
court can be understood as one that equates the ‘community of ordinary 
reasonable people’ with the vast bulk of the geographically determined 
population, excepting perhaps a few ostracised individuals who flagrantly 
disregard social norms. Thus a realist court is likely to tend towards an 
inclusive definition of the relevant community, while moralism seems to 
provide greater scope for exclusion. 
 
The distinction between a moralist and a realist understanding of defamation 
law is likely to be subtle, but it exists nonetheless. Indeed, clear hints of these 
different interpretations of defamation law were apparent when we were 
interviewing various parties involved in defamation law. Take, for instance, 
the following exchange with a judge who has extensive experience of hearing 
defamation cases: 
 
Would it be fair to summarise the test of what is defamatory as the 
opinion of the ordinary reasonable person? 
Judge: Well it has to be, it’s the general audience. 
Who is the ordinary reasonable person? How would you describe 
that? 
Judge: Just the ordinary man in the street. The person you sit 
beside on the train. They’re ordinary Mums and Dads reading their 
newspapers, the man on the Clapham omnibus. 
Is there any meaningful difference between the expression “the 
ordinary person” and “the ordinary reasonable person”? If we 
were to lose the word “reasonable”, would it make any difference? 
Judge: Well, yes and no. The key to it is “reasonable”. There are 
plenty of people who will read things from a prejudiced viewpoint, 
or looking for the worst in something. … And there are others who 
take the opposite standard, it doesn’t occur to them that anything 
unkind is being said about anybody. You talk about a reasonable 
person as being somebody in the middle. 
 
In effect, then, defamation law reflects majority or average opinion. But 
compare this with the following from another judge, also with experience in 
defamation proceedings: 
 
Judge: I don’t think there’s any doubt that it [the ordinary 
reasonable person test] is in most situations what most people 
would think. But … in some special situations the law says there 
are particular reasons why the ordinary reasonable person is not 
what most people think…  
Let’s say that in a rural area, a slightly redneck area, a statement 
was made implying a person was racist towards Aboriginals. Now 
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even if you knew that most people out in that area actually were 
rather racist themselves, I think you’d find a court would say “no, 
we can’t take that as the standard because we can’t adopt a 
standard that is either contrary to law in the sense of contrary to the 
Racial Discrimination Act, or contrary to what the court would say, 
I suppose, are some very fundamental moral principles”. 
 
This judge is suggesting that there are situations in which prevailing attitudes 
need to be discounted in order to uphold certain moral principles, the 
determination of which is, presumably, the job of the court.  
 
C A Taxonomy of Interpretations of the Test 
for Defamation 
 
The distinct approaches of realism and moralism can now be combined with 
the methodologies I earlier identified as sectionalist and majoritarian to create 
a simple taxonomy of interpretations of the test that determines what is 
defamatory. First, there is majoritarian realism. The majoritarian realist court 
starts by deciding who falls within the community of ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’ by taking into account all views within the population. The question 
whether a publication is defamatory is then determined by reference to 
whatever attitudes are seen as prevalent in the community as thus defined. 
Simplified, this probably means that a publication is defamatory if most 
people residing in a specific area would disapprove of the imputed act or 
condition. 
 
Then there is majoritarian moralism. Defamation is once again decided by an 
enquiry into society’s prevailing views (thus the approach is majoritarian), 
but the court, in calculating which views prevail, discounts what it imagines 
to be the responses of those within the population whom the court (not the 
people) disqualifies as full community members on the basis that they fail to 
meet some threshold of morality and rationality as stipulated by the court. 
For instance, if the question before the court is whether it is defamatory to 
say of a woman that she reported her husband to the police for illegally 
smoking marijuana, the court might decide to discount the views of two 
groups: first, those who believe that it behoves a wife to behave as little more 
than her husband’s chattel, never acting against his wishes, and, secondly, 
those who believe that the prohibition on marijuana should be ignored. 
People with these ‘extreme’ views might be discounted, even if they are 
perceived as together encompassing a majority of the population, if the court 
feels the need to uphold certain ‘very fundamental moral principles’, to quote 
the judge interviewed above (in this case the principles of individual 
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autonomy and the rule of law). The question then becomes whether most 
‘ordinary reasonable people’, being those with more ‘moderate’ views on 
marital loyalty and narcotics laws, would disapprove of the alleged conduct. 
 
We can also envisage sectionalist moralism. The court decides who is 
contained within the community of ordinary reasonable people, but this time 
it suffices to render a publication defamatory if a sufficiently large section 
(which can include a minority) of that community would think less of the 
plaintiff. And finally there is sectionalist realism. Importantly this does not 
mean that a publication is defamatory just because some section of the 
population (for instance criminals) would think less of the plaintiff. 
Defamation law is clear that that is not so.
26
 But it may be defamatory if a 
sufficiently large number of ‘ordinary reasonable people’ as popularly 
defined, would think less of the plaintiff. So, for instance, if it could be 
established that people who oppose abortion are generally accepted by the 
general population as ‘ordinary reasonable people’, despite being in a 
minority, then under sectionalist realism an imputation relating to the 
procurement of an abortion is potentially defamatory.  
 
I suggest that any plausible reading of the test for defamation falls into one of 
the above four categories. I also suggest that authorities consistent with all 
four interpretations can be found. What is more, I propose that if sufficient 
interviews are conducted among those people who give thought to what is 
defamatory, be they judges or jurors, lawyers or scholars, defamers or the 
defamed, then we shall find interpretations of the test that will fall into each 
category. Certainly that was the experience in interviewing judges and 
lawyers. For instance, one judge we interviewed referred to the decision in 
Hepburn, which supports sectionalism, as an ‘aberration’, citing instead 
Reader’s Digest. Meanwhile another judge described Hepburn as 
‘quintessential’, the locus classicus on defamatory meaning. 
 
Just as interesting as judicial interpretations of the test for defamation are 
those of the general population. How might they interpret a test that refers to 
the ‘ordinary reasonable person’? This is important for two principal reasons. 
First, the issue of what is and is not defamatory is still likely to be decided by 
a jury, and most of the adult population is eligible for jury service.
27
 
                                                 
26 The point was pithily expressed by Eldridge: ‘[t]he fact that the plaintiff is lowered in the 
eyes of all the members of the Beneficial Burglars’ Society by a statement that his reports have 
greatly reduced the number of professional burglars in active practice, is not defamatory of the 
plaintiff:’ L Eldridge, The Law of Defamation (1978) 35. 
27 Following harmonisation of Australia’s defamation laws from 1 January 2006, in all 
jurisdictions except South Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital 
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Secondly, anyone might at some time be threatened with a defamation writ, 
or feel that they have been defamed. The way lay people interpret the 
‘ordinary reasonable person’ test might well determine whether they fight or 
settle, sue or let the matter drop. 
 
III AN EXERCISE IN EMPIRICALLY DETERMINING WHAT IS 
DEFAMATORY 
 
Before exploring further how lay people might interpret the law of 
defamation, it is interesting to conduct a straightforward empirical exercise in 
determining what is defamatory. For the purpose of this exercise, let us 
presently simplify Australia’s laws of defamation so that they refer not to the 
views of ‘ordinary reasonable people’ but to those of all adults living in 
Australia. On that basis, we interviewed by phone 3,000 randomly selected 
adults resident in Australia, describing to each respondent one of ten 
hypothetical media reports, so that each report was described to 300 
respondents.
28
 Each report was described so as to indicate that it imputes a 
particular act or condition. The ten people to whom the acts or conditions are 
imputed were not named or identified with any real person, but some 
information was given about each of them. For instance, the person imputed 
to have had an extramarital affair was described as a married man who holds 
a powerful public office. We deliberately chose media reports which were 
neither obviously defamatory nor clearly anodyne. The ten media reports, as 
described to the respondents, are listed in Table 1, alongside a concise 






                                                                                                                    
Territory, the parties to civil defamation proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, 
elect for the proceedings to be tried by jury: eg Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 21 (and 
mirroring legislation in all jurisdictions except South Australia, the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory). It is then for the jury to determine whether the defendant has 
published defamatory matter about the plaintiff: eg Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 22. In 
South Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory all civil actions for 
defamation will be tried by judge alone.  
28 To ensure that the respondents were as representative of the population as possible, random 
selection of residential phone numbers was used. Interviewees were then selected from 
individual households by reference to which qualifying household member was next to have a 
birthday. The 3,000 respondents were randomly allocated to one of ten groups, each containing 
300 respondents. Each group was given a description of one of the ten hypothetical media 
reports. 
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Once the report had been described, respondents were asked a series of 
questions. In particular they were asked whether, as a result of the report, 
they would think less of the person to whom the particular act or condition 
                                                 
29 The identifier was not shared with the respondents. 






Report description (as given to respondents) 
Extramarital 
Affair 
The media, while talking about a particular, named married 
man who holds a powerful public office, have reported that 
he has an affair with an intelligent and glamorous married 
woman, and neither of them tells their spouse. 
Drunkenness The media, while talking about a particular, named 37 year-
old secretary in the Prime Minister’s office, have reported 
that she has got drunk at an office party and then danced on 
the tables with her skirt lifted.  
Marijuana 
Use 
The media, while talking about a particular, named man, have 
reported that he occasionally smokes a little marijuana 
socially or for relaxation. 
Recreational 
Sex 
The media, while talking about a particular, named single 
woman, have reported that she sleeps with a number of men 
each year simply to enjoy having sex with them.  
Informing 
Police 
The media, while talking about a particular, named woman, 
have reported that she has reported her husband to the police 




The media, while talking about a particular, named man, have 
reported that he has a parent who is a criminal. 
Conducting 
Abortions 
The media, while talking about a particular, named medical 
doctor, have reported that she conducts lawful abortions.  
HIV Positive The media, while talking about a particular, named man, have 
reported that he is HIV positive. 
Male 
Homosexuality 
The media, while talking about a particular, named man, have 
reported that he is homosexual.  
Sex Before 
Marriage 
The media, while talking about a particular, named young 
woman, have reported that she had a single sexual 
relationship before getting married. 
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had been imputed.
30
 As expected, the proportion answering yes varied 
significantly depending on the imputation in question. The smallest 
proportion was 11% (Sex Before Marriage), the largest 56% (Extramarital 
Affair).
31
 If we now apply a sectionalist test, so that a publication is 
defamatory if it would cause, say, 10% of the population to think less of the 
plaintiff, then all ten reports are potentially defamatory. But if a majoritarian 
test is employed, so that a report is defamatory only if it would cause a 
majority of Australia’s adults to think less of the plaintiff, then the 




So far we have taken as a base population all adults resident in Australia. But 
the law, in defining what is defamatory, typically speaks in terms of ‘ordinary 
reasonable people’. This being so (and pretending for a moment that such 
empirical findings are admissible) what should a court make of the poll 
results? Let us assume that the court takes a majoritarian, as opposed to 
sectionalist view of the law, since this seems to be the orthodox interpretation 
of the test for defamation. That being the case, we might for present purposes 
interpret the answer to what is defamatory as determined by the views of 
most ‘ordinary reasonable people’. Let us also assume that the court, when it 
comes to geographical delineation of the population, takes a national 
perspective, so that the views of adults throughout Australia are potentially 
relevant. Even so, the court is obliged to disregard the views of all those who 
fail to qualify as ‘ordinary reasonable people’.  
 
If the court is moralist, the survey will give little guidance as to what is 
defamatory. That is because the base population will depend on the court’s 
subjective views as to the relevance of the imputed facts when it comes to 
determining a person’s moral character. But if the court is realist, it will 
consider the views of ‘ordinary reasonable people’ as popularly defined. For 
instance, it will ask whether someone who would disapprove of the man 
referred to in Extramarital Affair would be generally accepted among the 
population as an ‘ordinary reasonable person’. 
 
                                                 
30 In the case of Extramarital Affair this was the man, for Recreational Sex and Informing 
Police it was the woman, and in the case of Criminal Parentage it was the son. 
31 Unless the contrary is indicated, all proportions in this paper are rounded to the nearest 
percentage point. 
32 Since the proportion who said that they would think less of the subject of Extramarital 
Affair (56%) is not much greater than 50% there is a 40% possibility that our survey 
respondents are unrepresentative of the population to the extent that in fact a minority of the 
population would think less of this person. 
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With this in mind, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the 
‘ordinary reasonable person living in Australia’.
33
 For instance, those asked 
for their response to the man referred to in Extramarital Affair were also 
asked whether they thought his reputation has been damaged in the eyes of 
the ‘ordinary reasonable person living in Australia’. The proportion 
answering yes was 83%. What is more, 52% of those who said they 
personally would not think less of the man said that nevertheless they could 
regard those who would think less of him as both ordinary and reasonable.
34
 
Since people who would disapprove of the man are generally accepted as 
ordinary reasonable people, and since the likelihood is that the majority of the 
population would think less of the man, it seems clear that a realist court 
should consider him defamed.   
 
But what of the other nine hypothetical media reports? In each case, a 
majority of respondents said they would not think less of the key person 
referred to therein. But does that also mean that most ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’, as popularly defined, would think likewise? The obvious answer 
would be yes, assuming that most people consider themselves an ‘ordinary 
reasonable person’. If I approve, or at least do not disapprove, of certain 
behaviour, and if I think of myself as an ‘ordinary reasonable person’, it 
should follow that I perceive a potential for other ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’ to be similarly tolerant of the behaviour in question. Based on those 
assumptions, if most of the population does not disapprove of the said 
behaviour, it must follow that the community of ‘ordinary reasonable 
people’, as popularly defined, includes those who do not disapprove. Indeed, 
in the case of all reports except for Extramarital Affair, a majority of those 
who said they would think less of the key person in the report said that they 
could think of those who would not think less of that person as both ordinary 
and reasonable. It should follow that in the case of every report, save for 
Extramarital Affair, a court that adopts a majoritarian realist interpretation of 
the law must find for the defendant on the question of whether the report is in 
fact defamatory.  
 
A Comparing Public Opinion with Legal Outcomes 
 
Based on this opinion poll, some answers have now been given as to whether 
ten hypothetical reports are defamatory. Under sectionalism, any number of 
                                                 
33 For reasons that will become apparent later in this paper, only 1,000 of the respondents (100 
per media report) were asked questions relating to the response of the ‘ordinary reasonable 
person’ to the report put to them. 
34 These questions were put to all 300 respondents asked about Extramarital Affair.  
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the reports might be defamatory, depending on what size section of the 
community must think less of a plaintiff before that person can properly be 
regarded as defamed. And a poll is of limited assistance if the law should be 
regarded as moralist. But under majoritarian realism, it has been suggested 
that only one out of the ten reports is defamatory: Extramarital Affair. 
 
This finding is significant for a number of reasons. First, it was found that 
majoritarian realism, as defined in this paper, best encapsulates the 
understanding of most defamation law practitioners and judges as regards the 
law of defamation. That being so, special consideration is due to that 
interpretation of the law.  
 
Secondly, the finding is at odds with the indications given by an analysis of 
trial precedents as to which of the ten reports is in practice likely to be found 
defamatory by a court. All ten reports were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
based on real publications that have formed the basis of proceedings.
35
 Those 
precedents, as well as an examination of recent reported and unreported 
litigation involving related imputations, indicate that, in the case of all but 
one of the reports, there is a realistic possibility (and in some cases 
probability) that a court would find the subject of the reports to have been 
defamed.
36
 This might seem a matter of concern, given that the phone survey 
                                                 
35 The following decisions were thought to be of particular relevance: as regards Extramarital 
Affair: Cairns v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd; Morosi v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1983] 2 
NSWLR 708; as regards Drunkenness: Bogusz v Thomson (1989) 95 FLR 167; as regards 
Marijuana Use: Speirs v Herald & Weekly Times (unreported, Victoria County Court, 1988), 
referred to in ‘Defamation Table of Quantum’, Gazette of Law and Journalism, Nov 1996, 18; 
as regards Recreational Sex: Random House Australia Pty Ltd v Abbott, Random House 
Australia Pty Ltd v Costello (1999) 167 ALR 224; as regards Informing Police: Blair v Mirror 
Newspapers Ltd (1970) 2 DCR (NSW) 191, aff’d [1970] 2 NSWR 604; as regards Criminal 
Parentage: Livingstone-Thomas v Associated Newspapers Ltd (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 
223 (1969, NSW Court of Appeal); as regards Conducting Abortions: Hepburn v TCN Channel 
Nine Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 682; as regards HIV Positive: Serdar v Metroland Printing 
Publishing and Distributing Ltd [2001] OTC 318; as regards Male Homosexuality: Kelly v 
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 586 (unreported, Levine J, 27 June 2003); 
as regards Sex Before Marriage: Costello v Random House Australia Pty Ltd, Abbott v 
Random House Australia Pty Ltd 137 ACTR 1 (1999). 
36 For the relevant reports see above n 35. All cases are Australian apart from the cases relating 
to HIV Positive, where only American and Canadian cases could be found, even though I am 
aware of at least one imputation of HIV infection (on Australian television) leading to a 
settlement of a defamation claim (prior to the commencement of proceedings) against an 
Australian publisher, which is believed to have involved the payment of damages and costs to 
the complainant. The one exception is Informing Police, there being authority to the effect that 
an imputation relating to assisting the police in the apprehension of lawbreakers is not even 
capable of being defamatory.  The only hypothetical report where there is clear authority to the 
effect that the relevant imputation is incapable of being defamatory is Informing Police (see 
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indicates that in the case of seven of the ten reports there is a less than 0.5% 
likelihood that a majority of Australian adult residents would think less of the 
plaintiff. 
 
All kinds of explanations might be given for this disparity. Perhaps the 
descriptions of the publications given to the phone survey respondents did 
not accurately capture the essence of imputations conveyed by the original 
reports, or possibly social attitudes had moved on by the time of the phone 
survey. Even so, it is interesting to note what happened when the ten reports 
were described, in terms identical to those used in the phone survey, to eight 
judges and 28 defamation law practitioners at around the same time as the 
survey.
37
 The judges were asked two questions: first, whether they considered 
the hypothetical reports to be capable in law of being considered defamatory 
and, secondly, whether they would anticipate a finding that the reports are 
defamatory from a properly instructed jury. Practitioners were asked whether 
they would expect a judge to find the reports capable of being defamatory 
and whether they would predict a properly instructed jury to find the reports 
defamatory. In the case of six reports a majority of judges thought one or 
more imputations arose that were capable of being defamatory, while in the 
case of three reports a majority foresaw a jury verdict of defamation. In the 
case of eight reports a majority of the practitioners predicted that a judge 
would find in favour of the plaintiff on the question of capacity,
38
 while in the 
case of five of the reports at least half of the lawyers predicted a verdict of 




Again there are many potential explanations for these findings, but three are 
particularly worth considering. One is that the lawyers are right: the ten 
hypothetical reports are likely to be found defamatory, the explanation being 
                                                                                                                    
Blair v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1970) 2 DCR(NSW) 191, aff’d [1970] 2 NSWR 604). It is 
curious, then that 82% of the 28 lawyers we interviewed thought that this report was capable 
of defaming the wife (who is imputed to have reported her husband to the police) and 71% 
predicted a jury finding of defamation.   
37 For details of the jurisdictions in which these interviews took place see above n 7. 
38 The eight reports are Extramarital Affair (considered capable of being defamatory by 100% 
of the lawyers), Drunkenness (100%), Recreational Sex (93%), Marijuana Use (93%), HIV 
Positive (89%), Conducting Abortions (86%), Informing Police (82%) and Male 
Homosexuality (75%). Sex Before Marriage and Criminal Parentage were both considered 
capable of defaming by 36% of the lawyers. 
39 The five reports are Extramarital Affair (86% of the lawyers predicting a jury finding of 
defamation), Drunkenness (86%), Informing Police (71%), HIV Positive (68%) and 
Recreational Sex (50%). As for the remaining five reports, 39% of the lawyers predicted a jury 
verdict of defamation for Marijuana Use, 25% for Male Homosexuality, 18% for Criminal 
Parentage, 11% for Conducting Abortions and 7% for Sex Before Marriage. 
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that courts approach defamation using a methodology other than majoritarian 
realism. For instance, if courts tend to adopt a sectionalist approach then it 
would not be too surprising if a large proportion of our media reports were 
found defamatory. But lengthy interviewing of the lawyers suggests that 
around four out of five of them (possibly more) interpret the law in 
accordance with majoritarian realism, with just one practitioner possibly 
embracing sectionalism, while most of the judges also take a majoritarian 




A second possibility is that the judges and lawyers tended to overestimate the 
proportion of the population that would disapprove of the acts or conditions 
imputed by the hypothetical reports. It may be that they are poor predictors of 
jury verdicts: they expect a verdict of defamation when juries are likely to 
find the report non-defamatory. But if that is so, it is interesting to note that 
the more experienced lawyers, who might be expected to be better at 
forecasting trial outcomes, were actually more likely to predict a judicial 
finding of capacity to defame, as well as a jury verdict of defamation, than 
were the less experienced lawyers. It is hard to explain why experience in 
defamation litigation should make a lawyer’s predictions in relation to 
judicial findings and jury verdicts less reliable.  
 
A third possibility, then, is that lawyers, particularly the more experienced, 
are relatively adept at predicting jury verdicts. It may also be that juries tend 
to apply majoritarian realism, meaning that they try to decide what is 
defamatory by reference to what most people think. Even so, it may be that 
jury verdicts bear little relation to community attitudes.  
 
It is this possibility that I intend to explore further, since it would appear the 
most plausible. This is for various reasons. First, one would expect those with 
considerable experience of defamation trials to be more competent than most 
at forecasting how a jury is likely to respond. Secondly, our qualitative 
research using focus groups consisting of various sections of the community 
clearly suggests that lay people, when asked about the opinions of ‘ordinary 
reasonable people’, overwhelmingly tend to interpret such questions as 
relating to what most people think, or what the ‘average’ or ‘typical’ person 
thinks, this being precisely what majoritarian realism seeks to reflect. It 
seems likely, then, that most juries operate on the majoritarian realist model. 
                                                 
40 Very considerable difficulty was encountered in clearly categorising the lawyers as 
majoritarian or sectionalist, moralist or realist. Most seemed to have given the matter little or 
no thought and some would contradict themselves within the same interview when trying to 
describe their understanding of the law. The same applied to the judges we interviewed. Even 
so, majoritarian realism seemed to be favoured, particularly amongst the lawyers. 
2008                                                              Defamation and the Moral Community 23 
So why might jury verdicts fail to reflect social values? One answer may lie 
in the fact that juries, like judges, are instructed, when deciding what is 
defamatory (and in the case of the judge, deciding what in law is capable of 
being defamatory), to set aside their personal values, as well as their own 
interpretation of the publication in question. The issue is not what the 
individual judge or juror thinks the publication means, nor how she or he 
regards the propriety of whatever it imputes, but what the ‘ordinary 
reasonable person’ would think.  
 
The rationale behind this policy is obvious. Juries are commonly understood, 
at least by the judges and lawyers we interviewed, to be intended as 
representatives of the general community. That, surely, is a major rationale 
for their involvement in defamation litigation. But it does not take a 
statistician to appreciate that there is a real risk that a handful of jurors, let 
alone a single judge, will not accurately reflect society’s composition. That 
being so, it may seem safer to ask judges and jurors to set aside their personal 
views. Instead of jurors being used as a sample of society, as would happen 
with a phone survey, jurors are employed for their knowledge of social 
attitudes, probably because this knowledge is perceived as superior to that of 
our relatively cloistered judiciary. It is understood that, statistically, jurors are 
unlikely to collectively constitute the fabled ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’, 
but the hope is that they will at least rub shoulders with him. That being so, 
jurors are not asked what they as ‘ordinary reasonable people’ think, but what 
‘ordinary reasonable people’ think. 
 
Previously in this paper, the phone survey was used as a means of gauging 
whether a court should find ten imaginary reports defamatory. But the poll 
can also be used as an indicator of what a jury is likely to make of those ten 
reports, given that jurors, like the phone survey respondents, are drawn from 
the general community. In order to do so, it was necessary to approach the 
phone survey respondents as a court would a jury. With that in mind, one 
third of the respondents were asked the kind of question jurors would be 
asked if the ten reports gave rise to litigation: would the ‘ordinary reasonable 




Given the relatively small proportions of respondents who said that they 
themselves would think less of that person, the proportions who said that the 
                                                 
41 In order to allow for ‘carry-over effect’ (the effect of one question on answers to subsequent 
questions) half of the respondents were asked about their own reaction to the media report 
prior to being asked about the reaction of the ‘ordinary reasonable person’, while the other half 
were asked about the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ first. 
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‘ordinary reasonable person’ would think less of that person are staggering. 
For instance, just 16% of respondents said they would think less of the 
subject of HIV Positive, but 77% predicted that the ordinary reasonable 
person would think less of him. As illustrated in Figure 1, a similar pattern 
emerged for all ten reports: in each case the proportion of respondents who 
considered the report put to them to be defamatory in the eyes of the ordinary 
reasonable person far exceeded the proportion who said that they would 
personally think less of the subject of the report.  
 
Figure 1: Proportions of respondents indicating that the media report is 
defamatory in their own eyes, compared with the proportions 





Based on these results, what verdicts should we expect from a jury that 
constitutes a representative sample of Australian adults? Assuming that a jury 
will find that a report is defamatory if a majority of its members take the view 
that the ordinary reasonable person is likely to think less of the plaintiff, and 
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assuming that a jury consists of just four adults,
42
 and imagining for a 
moment that they are randomly selected from the entire resident adult 
population of Australia, as opposed to any particular region, the phone survey 
suggests that the probability of a jury verdict of defamation is greater than 




This outcome has to be read in the context of the two findings reported 
above. First, it will be recalled that in the case of eight reports a majority of 
the defamation law practitioners we interviewed predicted that a judge would 
find in favour of the plaintiff on the question of capacity,
44
 while in the case 
of five of the reports at least half of the lawyers predicted a verdict of 
defamation from the jury.
45
 What is more, the more experienced lawyers 
tended to predict more verdicts of defamation than their more junior 
colleagues. The predictions of the experienced lawyers are not vastly 
different from the verdicts indicated as probable by the phone survey.  
 
Secondly, the phone survey suggests that in the case of seven of the ten 
reports there is a less than 0.5% likelihood that a majority of Australian adult 
residents would think less of the plaintiff. That being so, why might it be that 
the same survey, when used to predict jury verdicts, suggests that all but two 
reports will be found to be defamatory? If jury verdicts are meant to reflect 
how most Australian adults would relate to a publication, this does not appear 
to be the outcome. Instead, something about the jury process would seem to 




                                                 
42 Four is the number of jurors who sit in defamation actions in New South Wales, the State 
with the largest number of defamation actions in Australia. 
43 The eight reports are Drunkenness (probability of a jury verdict: 89%), Extramarital Affair 
(86%), Recreational Sex (82%), Criminal Parentage (77%), HIV Positive (77%), Male 
Homosexuality (67%), Marijuana Use (55%) and Informing Police (51%). In the case of the 
two remaining reports (Conducting Abortions and Sex Before Marriage) the probability of a 
jury verdict of defamation is 41% and 16% respectively.   
44 The eight reports are Extramarital Affair (considered capable of being defamatory by 100% 
of the lawyers), Drunkenness (100%), Recreational Sex (93%), Marijuana Use (93%), HIV 
Positive (89%), Conducting Abortions (86%), Informing Police (82%) and Male 
Homosexuality (75%). Sex Before Marriage and Criminal Parentage were both considered 
capable of defaming by 36% of the lawyers. 
45 The five reports are Extramarital Affair (86% of the lawyers predicting a jury finding of 
defamation), Drunkenness (86%), Informing Police (71%), HIV Positive (68%) and 
Recreational Sex (50%). As for the remaining five reports, 39% of the lawyers predicted a jury 
verdict of defamation for Marijuana Use, 25% for Male Homosexuality, 18% for Criminal 
Parentage, 11% for Conducting Abortions and 7% for Sex Before Marriage. 
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B The Third Person Effect 
 
What has been discovered appears to be another facet of a phenomenon first 
identified in communications studies literature in 1983. W Phillips Davison 
proposed the hypothesis that individuals tend to perceive the impact of a 
message as greater on others than on themselves.
46
 He dubbed this the ‘third-
person effect’, because media (and particularly mass media) are perceived as 
having their greatest impact not on ‘me’ or ‘you’, but on ‘them’ – the third 
persons. 
 
By 1996, some 13 years after Davison’s article coining the term ‘third-person 
effect’, there were 16 published studies relating to the phenomenon. 
According to a review of these conducted by Richard M Perloff, all but one 
supported the hypothesis to some extent, leading him to conclude that there is 
‘abundant evidence’ of the effect’s existence.
47
 A broader meta-analysis 
conducted in 2000 concluded that the third-person effect’s perceptual 
hypothesis is a ‘moderate to robust finding’.
48
 This examined 32 published 
and unpublished studies relating to the phenomenon in such contexts as 
advertising, violence on television and pornography. 
 
To date attempts to measure the relationship between the third-person effect 
and defamation law appear limited to three small-scale experiments 
conducted in the United States between 1988 and 1995. Two of these used 
convenience samples.
49
 In the case of Jeremy Cohen’s research (1988), this 
consisted of 132 Stanford students,
50
 while Albert Gunther’s subjects were 
128 undergraduates from the University of Minnesota (1991).
51
 The third 
experiment, by Laurie Mason (1995), used 79 prospective jurors called for 
duty in a Californian court.
52
 
                                                 
46 W Phillips Davison, ‘The Third-Person Effect in Communication’ (1983) 47 Public Opinion 
Quarterly 1. 
47 Richard M. Perloff, ‘Perceptions and Conceptions of Political Media Impact: The Third-
Person Effect and Beyond’ in Ann N Crigler (ed) The Psychology of Political Communication 
(1996) 177. 
48 Bryant Paul, Michael B. Salwen and Michel Dupagne, ‘The Third-Person Effect: A Meta-
Analysis of the Perceptual Hypothesis’ (2000) 3(1) Mass Communication & Society 57, 80. 
49 A ‘convenience sample’ refers to a sample used for an experiment or survey that is not 
expected to be representative of the population under examination. Typically it will consist of 
university students.  
50 Jeremy Cohen et al, ‘Perceived Impact of Defamation: An Experiment on Third-Person 
Effects’ (1988) 52 Public Opinion Quarterly 161. 
51 Albert Gunther, ‘What We Think Others Think: Cause and Consequence in the Third-Person 
Effect’ (1991) 18(3) Communication Research 355. 
52 Laurie Mason, ‘Newspaper as Repeater: An Experiment on Defamation and Third-Person 
Effect’ (1995) 72(3) Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 610. 
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Both Cohen and Gunther found a significant third-person effect when their 
subjects were asked to consider the consequences to reputation of various 
imaginary newspaper articles. The phenomenon was detectable even when 
undergraduates were asked to estimate the impact of defamatory reports on 
third persons as close to themselves as other students in their class. As the 
group whose views were to be considered became broader (such as ‘public 
opinion at large’), so too grew the third-person effect. This being the case, we 
might expect a large third-person effect when individuals are asked about the 
‘ordinary reasonable person’, given that our focus groups suggest that this is 
taken to be the personification of majority or average opinion. The 
phenomenon was also found to increase with a perception that the newspaper 
publishing the report was biased against the defamed party or was unreliable 
in its factual reporting. 
 
Gunther reported that the third-person effect represents an overestimation of 
media impact on others rather than an underestimation of the same on the 
self.
53
 Cohen established the same finding when it came to media sources 
perceived as biased against the defamed party, but if the newspaper was seen 
to favour that person then the students seemed to underestimate effects on 
self while accurately predicting influence on other Stanford students.
54
 Even 
so, other studies unrelated to defamation tend to corroborate that the third-
person effect involves exaggeration of impact on others rather than 




Mason also found evidence of the third-person effect, but only weak support 
for her hypothesis that subjects are more susceptible to the phenomenon 





Use of the phrase ‘third-person effect’ varies from writer to writer. In this 
paper the term is used to indicate a belief on the part of an individual (‘the 
first person’) that a specified media report will have a greater detrimental 
effect on the reputation of the subject of that report in the eyes of others (‘the 
third persons’) than in the eyes of the first person. For instance, people will 
be taken to display the third-person effect if they believe that others will be 
                                                 
53 Gunther, above n 51, 366. 
54 Cohen, above n 50, 170. 
55 D Lasorsa ‘Policymakers and the Third-Person Effect’ in J D Kennamer (ed) Public 
Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy (1994) 163, 167; Richard M. Perloff, ‘Third-Person 
Effect Research 1983 – 1992: A Review and Synthesis’, (1993) 5(2) International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research, 167, 178. 
56 Mason, above n 52, 615.  
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more likely than themselves to think badly of a man as a result of a report 
that he is gay. People who imagine others to be less likely than themselves to 
think poorly of the man are said to display the ‘reverse third-person effect’, 
while those who perceive their reaction to the man as neither more nor less 
favourable than that of others display neither a third-person effect nor a 
reverse third-person effect. 
 
Research has centred on the third-person effect as a form of collective 
misperception. If a large section of the population sees others as more 
affected by a media message than themselves, then where there is little or no 
countervailing tendency for individuals to see others as less affected than 
themselves there has necessarily been a collective misapprehension, either as 
to the effect on the self or as to the effect on others. 
 
When the results for our ten media reports are aggregated, we found that 44% 
of respondents displayed the third-person effect when asked whether they and 
the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ would think less of the subject of the media 
report put to them, while less than 3% displayed the countervailing ‘reverse 
third-person effect’.
57
 A further 49% displayed neither effect.
58
 These 
proportions are consistent with other surveys and experiments, which 
generally find that the population divides approximately 50:50 between those 
who display the third-person effect and those who perceive the impact of 
communications on others as the same as on the self. In almost every case the 




C The Third Person Effect and the ‘Moral’ Community 
 
What does the third-person effect mean for defamation law? Whatever 
methodology should be adopted when deciding whether a publication is 
defamatory, some quantification of social attitudes is involved. The third-
person effect predicts not only that this process will be distorted, but also that 
                                                 
57 These proportions are based on answers to the questions relating to whether the respondent 
and/or the third person would think less of the subject of the media report put to them. It does 
not include those respondents who displayed the third-person effect (or reverse third-person 
effect) to the extent that they indicated that they would bear antipathy towards the subject of 
the media report, but the third person would bear more (or less) antipathy towards the same. 
The proportions displaying the third-person effect or the reverse third-person effect could 
therefore be argued to be somewhat higher. Even so, the significant fact remains that far more 
display the third-person effect than show a reverse third-person effect. 
58 5% said they did not know when asked about their own and/or the ordinary reasonable 
person’s response to the report. 
59 Lasorsa, above n 55, 169. 
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this will inevitably favour those who complain of defamation. As a 
consequence expression will be unnecessarily and unintentionally silenced. 
 
This injustice comes with a particular irony, one that becomes apparent if we 
start to speculate as to the cause of the third-person effect. Of the countless 
possible explanations as to why individuals should say that they would not 
think less of someone in the media while the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ 
would, three stand out. The first relates to the widespread perception, 
strongly and repeatedly expressed during the focus group discussions, that 
media reports are unreliable. It may be that individuals tend to perceive the 
‘ordinary reasonable person’ as credulous, relative to themselves, when it 
comes to the media. This hypothesis is supported by the findings of Cohen 
and Gunther to the effect that perceptions of media bias increase the third-
person effect: bias in the media can lead to deception by the media, 
something that only the gullible ‘ordinary reasonable person’ would fall for. 
 
The second is that, instead of (or as well as) being easily bamboozled, 
‘ordinary reasonable people’ are understood by many of us to display a 
greater tendency, compared to ourselves, to choose a defamatory over an 
innocent interpretation for ambiguous language. Even so, the descriptions of 
the hypothetical media reports used in the study were designed so as to spell 
out the imputed conduct as clearly as possible. For instance, we explicitly 
referred to an extramarital affair, as opposed to alluding to it, which might 
have been the case if we had spoken of the man and woman ‘checking into a 
hotel together’.  
 
The third, and, I suggest, more likely explanation is that individuals tended to 
perceive the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ as subscribing to values according 
to which the imputed acts or conditions are immoral, whereas in fact they are 
not. For instance, someone who believes that sex should be exclusive to 
procreation might disapprove of the woman in Recreational Sex. Note how 
disparagement on the basis of most (perhaps all) of the media reports used in 
this experiment is likely to be associated with attitudes that are themselves 
widely denigrated in contemporary morality, particularly homophobia and 
sexism. This also became apparent from the focus groups. The attitude being 
expressed by the third-person effect may be ‘others are homophobic, sexist 
and so on, but I am not’. In support of this hypothesis, note how HIV Positive 
produced a particularly large third-person effect. In recent decades Australia 
has seen public education campaigns aimed at addressing the denigration of 
people with HIV. Such advertising sends the message not only that 
denigration of those with HIV constitutes bigotry, but also that such 
campaigns are needed in the face of widespread prejudice.   
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In short, ‘ordinary reasonable people’, for all their reasonableness, represent 
not rationality and decency but gullibility and bigotry. Indeed there seems to 
be a complete mismatch between how the phone survey respondents 
answered our questions and how courts are expected to perform. Every judge 
and lawyer we spoke to was of the view that judges and jurors should not 
decide what is defamatory by reference to their personal views. The common 
refrain was that they should put aside their ‘prejudices’, a telling word. The 
perception conveyed by almost every judge and lawyer was that judges and 
jurors will, when asked to consider community attitudes, recognise and 
detach themselves from their own occasional lapses into irrationality and 
prejudice, embracing instead common sense and basic decency. When 
pressed on the core values behind this shared sense of decency, there were 
numerous allusions to equality, tolerance and social inclusiveness. The 
supposition is that individuals feel a comfortable identity with and affinity for 
the mass of their fellow citizens. Certainly we are not perfect, but we are 
essentially good. 
 
Instead, the third-person effect suggests that we see the bulk of the 
community somewhat differently. Instead of happily rubbing shoulders 
amidst civil society, we prefer to stand at or near its pinnacle, seeing the rest 
as stupid, bigoted or both. When asked about the ‘ordinary reasonable 
person’, our collective tendency is not to put aside our prejudices, but rather 
to adopt the prejudices we perceive in others.  
 
The point can be illustrated empirically. Let us take those respondents who 
displayed the third-person effect, meaning those who said that the ‘ordinary 
reasonable person’ would think less of the subject put to the respondent while 
the respondent would not. These are the respondents who might regard 
themselves as particularly progressive in their attitudes to homosexuality, 
gender and the other issues raised in our reports. Those respondents were 
asked whether they felt able to consider those who would think less of the 
report’s subject (probably those whom the respondents see as less progressive 
than themselves) as ordinary and reasonable.
60
 These, surely, are the two 
qualities we would expect of the ‘ordinary reasonable person’. 
 
Only 43% of these ‘progressive’ respondents said that they felt able to 
consider those who would think less of the subject of the report as both 
                                                 
60 In order to allow for ‘carry-over effect’ (see above, n 41) half of the respondents were asked 
whether they could think less of those who disagreed with them about whether to think less of 
the subject of the report as ‘ordinary’ before being asked whether they could think of such 
people as ‘reasonable’, while for the other half the order of these two questions was reversed. 
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ordinary and reasonable. Around 30% said they could regard such people as 
ordinary but not reasonable, while just 4% said they could think of them as 
reasonable but not ordinary and just 15% could think of them as neither 
ordinary nor reasonable. 
 
We now encounter an apparent incongruity. Of those respondents who 
identified disapproval as the response of the ‘ordinary reasonable person’, a 
large proportion (49%, in fact) went on to say that they could not think of 
people who would disapprove as ordinary and reasonable. In other words, 
people who think like the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ are neither ‘ordinary’ 
nor ‘reasonable’! 
 
What seems to be happening is that, for a large proportion of the population, 
the phrase ‘ordinary reasonable person’ takes on a meaning that has little to 
do with its constituent adjectives, particular the second (‘reasonable’). To 
many the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ represents whatever is perceived as 
typical of the population. This was the view repeatedly expressed during 
focus groups: it was clear that questions about the ‘ordinary reasonable’ 
person were frequently understood as questions about majority or average 
opinion. Those who indicated that the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ is not 
‘ordinary’ or not ‘reasonable’ were presumably expressing disapproval of 
what they perceive to be public opinion. Almost half of the people who 
displayed the third-person effect seemed to do this by denying people who 
think in accordance with public opinion the accolade ‘reasonable’. It would 
seem logical for an individual to do this if they identify public opinion as 
irrational or bigoted, but it is paradoxical that 19% of respondents displaying 
the third-person effect appeared to be indicating that people who ascribe to 
what those respondents decry as public opinion are not ‘ordinary’. Perhaps 
the explanation lies in the ability of ‘ordinary’ to constitute an affirmation, 
not unlike ‘reasonable’.  
 
D The Third Person Effect and the 
‘Reasonable Person’ 
 
Although ‘ordinary’ can be an accolade, it is less unambiguously positive 
than ‘reasonable’. It has been suggested that the law inserts reasonableness 
into the test so as to rule out perverse readings of text, since publishers 
should only be held accountable for sensible interpretations of their works.
61
 
Indeed, it was clear from focus group discussions that reasonableness and 
ordinariness are not understood as synonymous, and the distinction is 
                                                 
61 For instance, Mitchell, above n 12, 39-40. 
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supported by the quantitative research, which suggests that it is easier to 
qualify as ‘ordinary’ than it is to qualify as ‘reasonable’. Accordingly, 73% 
of respondents said that, as regards those who would disagree with their 
evaluation of the imputed act or condition, the respondents could think of 
those people as ‘ordinary’, while just 58% could think of them as 
‘reasonable’. 
 
Consistent with those results would be a finding that omission of the quality 
of reasonableness from the test for defamation would increase the third-
person effect. That would be because people would prefer to identify with the 
hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ than with the ‘ordinary person’, meaning 
that they would be more likely to perceive the former’s response to a 
publication as similar to their own.  
 
In order to test that hypothesis, the exercise described above was repeated 
with a further 2,000 respondents, but this time the description of the ‘third 
person’ (previously termed the ‘ordinary reasonable person’) was varied.
62
 
One thousand respondents were asked to predict the response to one of the 
ten media reports of the ‘ordinary person living in Australia’ as well as their 
own, while a further 1,000 respondents were asked about the ‘reasonable 




The results were anything but expected. Table 2 shows the proportions of 
respondents displaying the third-person and reverse third-person effect in 
relation to the three ‘third persons’ (the ‘ordinary’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘ordinary 
reasonable’ person) used in the survey. As can be seen, these are virtually 
identical.
64
 These aggregated results mask considerable variations in relation 
to individual reports, but even so our results suggest there would be no 
overall marked reduction in the third-person effect if the description of the 
relevant audience underwent such modifications. 
 
                                                 
62 In other respects all survey conditions were identical to those described above. 
63 As with those respondents asked about the responses of the ‘ordinary reasonable person’, 
question order was varied so as to allow for ‘carry-over effect’ (see above n 41 and 60). 
64 There are no statistically significant differences between the three groups. 
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Table 2: Proportions of respondents displaying third-person effect and 
reverse third-person effect when asked whether they and/or the 
third person would think less of the subject of the media 
















43% 42% 42% 42% 
Proportion displaying 
reverse third-person effect.  
2% 3% 3% 3% 
Proportion perceiving the 
third person’s reaction to 
the report as the same as 
their own.  
49% 49% 50% 49% 
Proportion answering 
‘don’t know’ in relation to 
their own and/or the third 
person’s reaction to the 
report.  
6% 7% 6% 6% 
 
Even so, might a change in the description of the relevant audience affect 
defamation law outcomes? If we again aggregate the results for our ten media 
reports, our findings suggest that changing the description? from ‘ordinary 
reasonable person’ to ‘reasonable person’ would have so little general effect 
that it is not even statistically discernable from our results. Overall, retaining 
the reference to reasonableness seems to favour defendants, but the benefit is 
marginal. Of the 1,000 respondents asked about the ‘ordinary reasonable 
person living in Australia’, 69% thought that this person would think less of 
the subject of the report described to them. Of the 1,000 asked about the 
‘ordinary person living in Australia’, the proportion anticipating disapproval 
                                                 
65 In this table account is taken only of the third-person effect or reverse third-person effect 
displayed in answering whether the respondent and the third person would think less of the 
subject of the report described to the respondent. It does not include the proportion of 
respondents displaying either effect in that, while perceiving the third person as well as 
themselves as thinking less of the subject, the respondent expected the third person to think 
even less of the subject than would the respondent (in the case of the third-person effect), or 
expected the third person to feel less disapproval than would the respondent (who would feel 
some) in the case of the reverse third-person effect. 
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I began this article by pointing to an ambiguity in the law of defamation. 
When the law asks us to consider what response a publication is likely to 
produce in a hypothetical audience, it is unclear whether those responses are 
intended to reflect majority or average opinion within the population. What is 
also far from apparent is the extent to which a judge or jury is entitled to 
disregard potential responses that the judge or jury (as opposed to public 
opinion) considers irrational, immoral or both. The proposition that they are 
entitled to do so derives from authorities that describe the constituents of the 
relevant hypothetical audience as ‘reasonable’, a term sometimes replaced by 
‘decent’, ‘right-thinking’, ‘sensible’ or some such term. 
 
Despite this ambiguity, some things are apparent. The intention behind the 
test for defamation is to reflect attitudes and values held by at least a 
substantial or appreciable section of the community. Indeed, most of the 
lawyers and judges we interviewed thought that those attitudes and values 
should be prevalent in society. Even more obvious, the test is not meant to 
discount attitudes and values on the basis that they are perceived to be 
reasonable, decent, right-thinking or sensible. To suggest otherwise is 
patently absurd. 
 
Even so, the evidence presented by this paper suggests that that is precisely 
the outcome of the test. This is based on the supposition that it is the 
subjective view of most of us that our own values are reasonable, decent and 
so on. Assuming also that juries and judges are just as likely to display the 
third-person effect as the respondents to the phone survey (and there is no 
obvious reason to think that this is not so), it would seem that, in deciding 
whether a publication is defamatory, many of those judges and juries set 
aside their own views on the imputed conduct, just as they are meant to. But 
what they tend to substitute for attitudes that they perceive as reasonable and 
decent are responses to the publication that they would attribute to someone 
who is gullible, prejudiced or both.  
 
The problem is that the law anticipates what in this paper has been identified 
as the reverse third-person effect: the setting aside of personal idiosyncrasies 
or ‘prejudices’ in favour of whatever is perceived as ordinary, reasonable 
                                                 
66 p < .02.  
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opinion. But the tiny proportion who display the reverse third-person effect is 
vastly outweighed by the much larger proportion who display the 
countervailing third-person effect. The consequence is that the hypothetical 
audience that decides what is defamatory consists of whoever is perceived as 
lacking good judgment. That audience becomes a bunch of idiotic bigots, not 
the ‘ordinary reasonable people’ the law has in mind. I have suggested that 
most judges’ and practitioners’ interpretation of the test for defamation can 
be characterised as majoritarian realism. But the phone survey suggests that 
what actually happens is the precise opposite. It might even be called 
sectionalist immoralism: defamation law gives voice not to society’s 
prevailing attitudes as to what is rational and moral, but rather to minority 
attitudes that are archaic at best, bigoted at worst.  
 
The cost of the third-person effect is borne not only by publishers who face 
the burden of defending material which should never have been considered 
defamatory in the first place. The phenomenon is detrimental to all of us. 
First, it inevitably limits our right to communicate and access information 
and ideas that are anticipated to damage reputation, even when such damage 
would in fact be far less than imagined. Secondly, for those who identify the 
‘ordinary reasonable person’ as a personification of public opinion, 
statements by lawyers or courts to the effect that a publication is defamatory 
will tend to enforce misconceptions about prevailing attitudes.  
 
Thirdly, the third-person effect obfuscates the types of values that the law 
endorses as reasonable. That is because some people will interpret legal 
findings in relation to the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ not as empirical 
statements relating to public opinion but as normative claims about what a 
reasonable person should (as opposed to does) think. Every time a lawyer 
claims, or a court finds that the ‘reasonable person’ disparages 
homosexuality, HIV infection, or any of the other acts or conditions imputed 
by the ten media reports used as the basis of this research, those views are 
entrenched as legally sanctioned. To that extent, defamation law retards 
progress towards a more just and tolerant society. It will continue to do so for 
as long as the law’s arbiter of defamation, the ‘ordinary reasonable person’, 
is identified with the irrational bigot, the sexist and the homophobe, precisely 
the person most of us least want to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
